In a comprehensive cross-national study involving samples from 12 different countries that were representative for the adult populations in terms of age and sex (N = 2,429), we found that women cooperate significantly less overall than men in fully incentivized oneshot prisoner's dilemma games. This gender gap in cooperation can be explained by the fact that women hold lower expectations regarding the cooperativeness of their anonymous interaction partners. These results contradict both the common stereotype that women are more communal, caring, emotionally expressive, and warm than men and substantial empirical evidence showing that women act more prosocially in many contexts.
Increasing equality between men and women is an important challenge for modern societies. To achieve this goal, a sound understanding of sex differences in cognition and behaviour -particularly in social contexts -is necessary. Several classes of theoretical accounts (for overviews, see Eagly & Wood, 1999; Wood & Eagly, 2002 ) predict sex differences in (prosocial) behaviour. First, the evolutionary perspective suggests that men and women differ in their behaviour because they have developed specialized mechanisms that were adaptive in primeval times (e.g., Buss, 1995) . Increased competitive and risk-tolerant behaviour on the part of men, for example, supposedly evolved through higher selection pressure, whereas a proclivity to nurture evolved in women due to their childbearing potential (e.g., Buss & Kenrick, 1998) . Second, from a social constructionist point of view, there are practically no real inherent sex differences; thus, differences in terms of cognition and behaviour are presumably largely caused by social influences (Mead, 1935) . Third, Social Role Theory, as a prominent biosocial model (Eagly & Wood, 1999) , combines these perspectives assuming that sex differences in cognition and behaviour result from innate differences that are accentuated by social influences. That is, it assumes the presence of a small number of genetic and hormonal differences between men and women that facilitate their success in terms of fulfilling different roles. Taking on the respective roles to an increasing degree leads to specializations that further enhance the initial differences as well as the perception thereof. Women, for example, are assumed to hold social roles that require communality to a larger degree than men, which results in a specialization in communality and related behaviours (Wood & Eagly, 2002) . According to Social Role Theory, observing women in these roles then shapes the respective stereotype about women. In line with these predictions, it has been shown that women are commonly perceived as being more communal (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008) , caring, emotionally expressive, and warm (Grossman & Wood, 1993) as well as more cooperative in strategic games (Solnick, 2001 ). Relatedly, a study including participants from 26 different nations investigated perceived sex differences concerning the five-factor model of personality and found that people have shared beliefs that women are more altruistic than men (L€ ockenhoff et al., 2014) .
Based on the theoretical approaches discussed above, women should be more prosocial than men. Empirical evidence from various contexts supports this prediction and is in line with the common stereotype. Indeed, women have been shown to be more supportive of their same-sex friends (Oswald, Clark, & Kelly, 2004) and more willing to support charity projects (Willer, Wimer, & Owens, 2015) , while girls more often pursue voluntary work than boys (Flanagan, Bowes, Jonsson, Csap o, & Sheblanova, 1998) . Women are also more frequently classified as prosocials in terms of Social Value Orientation (Van Lange, 1999) . In addition, a study involving individuals from 26 different nations shows that, overall, women score higher than men on the NEO-PI-R facet altruism (Costa, Terracciano, & McCrae, 2001 ). In the lab, prosocial behaviour in this kind of situation is often measured using dictator games in which people decide whether to keep an amount of money or share it with an anonymous person. The typical finding in dictator games is that women are more prosocial (i.e., give more) than men (Eckel & Grossman, 1998; Engel, 2011; Kamas & Preston, 2015) ; although such findings are discussed critically, since non-significant effects (Ben-Ner, Kong, & Putterman, 2004; Bolton & Katok, 1995) as well as mixed, context dependent findings (Andreoni & Vesterlund, 2001) have also been reported.
The sex differences discussed thus far concern situations involving mainly direct prosocial, altruistic, and helping behaviour. However, in contrast to dictator games and real world variants thereof, many social interactions (e.g., team work) have the structure of a social dilemma in which mutual interdependence between interaction partners exists and individual goals are at odds with collective goals. In social dilemmas, mutual cooperation would be the collectively desired outcome. However, each individual would be better off by defecting and free-riding on the others' contribution (Dawes, 1980) . In the case of full free-riding, the cooperative person is exploited and receives a particularly low payoff (Rapoport & Chammah, 1965) . Hence, choosing to cooperate does not only involve communality or prosociality but also a willingness to take risks and place one's trust in others. Free-riding, in turn, is motivated not only by less prosociality but potentially also the fear that the other person will act selfishly (Thielmann, B€ ohm, & Hilbig, 2015) . The cognitive aspect of this fear should be reflected in low expectations regarding the interaction partner's cooperation (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977) , which are generally a strong predictor of (one's own) cooperation (e.g., Chaudhuri, 2011) . In the situations discussed above for which more prosocial behaviour for females has been demonstrated (i.e., variants of dictator games), such interdependencies and potential influences of risk perception and fear are not involved.
Previous research has shown that risk preferences (Gl€ ockner & Hilbig, 2012) as well as trust (G€ achter, Herrmann, & Th€ oni, 2004) influence cooperation in social dilemmas and that females tend to be more risk averse (Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999; Charness & Gneezy, 2012; Croson & Gneezy, 2009 ) and less trusting in monetary tasks and financial transactions (Meyers-Levy & Loken, 2015) . Thus, it can be expected that differences between the sexes concerning cooperation in social dilemmas are influenced by not only differences in prosociality but also risk aversion and trust resulting in different expectations. Importantly, both factors are competing in that they influence sex differences in opposite directions. The higher degree of prosociality should lead to more cooperation for women as compared to men, whereas females' tendencies towards higher risk aversion and lower trust should lead to less cooperation in women. Along similar lines, it has been argued that men choose not to cooperate in social dilemmas primarily because of their agentic and less prosocial orientation, whereas women are motivated by their expectations reflecting the fear of other's defection (Simpson & Van Vugt, 2009 ). These assumptions have been supported empirically. Researchers have shown, for example, that women send more money to their interaction partner only when risk is not involved (i.e., in the role of a trustee versus that of trustor in a trust game; Buchan, Croson, & Solnick, 2008; Croson & Buchan, 1999) and that the expected return partially mediates the influence of sex on the amount sent (Buchan et al., 2008) . Furthermore, studying behaviour in a one-shot public goods game, women contributed significantly less than men and this difference is substantially driven by their lower expectations (Greig & Bohnet, 2009 ). Finally, considerable sex differences concerning trust could be observed in a recent cross-cultural study including participants from 17 nations (Romano, Balliet, Yamagishi, & Liu, 2017) . Specifically, in a trust game, men were found to trust more and were also more optimistic in their expectations regarding the amount of money they would receive from their interaction partners than women.
A meta-analysis involving 272 effect sizes (approx. half relating to prisoner's dilemmas) indicates that, overall, there is no significant sex difference in social dilemma cooperation (Balliet, Li, Macfarlan, & Van Vugt, 2011) . Importantly, the meta-analysis showed a stronger heterogeneity of effects than would be expected by a random distribution and identified important moderators. Specifically, sex differences in cooperation are largely context dependent. There is also initial evidence that sex differences might also vary between countries, although the results remain weak, since they are based on univariate analyses of studies that vary largely in many respects. Notably, the meta-analysis also reveals that the samples used and the methodology applied in previous research were highly selective. The research on sex differences primarily involved lab studies [265 of 272] , student samples [247 of 272] with a white, educated, industrialized, high socioeconomic status (SES), and democratic background (WEIRD; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010) , and a limited set of countries (United States: k = 177; Netherlands: k = 25; Canada: k = 12, and England: k = 11).
The current research addresses several research questions. First, we aim to investigate whether we observe a sex difference in cooperation using a more representative sample of participants in terms of age, 1 sex, and occupation and involving a larger set of countries. This is an open question, since the cooperation relevant factors introduced above -risk aversion (Halek & Eisenhauer, 2001; Mata, Josef, & Hertwig, 2016) , trust (Sutter & Kocher, 2007) , and prosocial behaviour (Matsumoto, Yamagishi, Li, & Kiyonari, 2016) -are influenced by age and other demographic factors. Hence, studies with more diverse participant samples would allow for conclusions with higher external validity.
Second, we aim to investigate the reasons for potential sex differences in cooperation in more detail. In doing so, we will focus on the question of whether sex differences are driven by differences in expectations, which are typically a strong predictor of cooperation in prisoner's dilemma games (e.g., Balliet & Van Lange, 2013) and are likely to differ between the sexes (Romano et al., 2017) .
Third, in order to test the different predictions from the three classes of theories described in the introduction, we will investigate whether sex differences vary between countries or, instead, are universal, meaning that they are found (with similar magnitude) for all nations. As explained above, Social Constructionist Theory would predict a low universality of sex differences given that the societies in question differ considerably in terms of societal structure. In contrast, evolutionary approaches would predict that the psychological adaptations are universal and sex differences of similar magnitude can be found across different societies. Finally, Social Role Theory, as a biosocial perspective, would predict that sex differences vary across cultures and are influenced by the separation of male and female social roles in the respective nation (Wood & Eagly, 2002) . To allow for a critical test, we included countries that differ substantially on important cultural dimensions (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010 ) (cf. Supporting Information, Table A1 ). Our samples also include countries that differ concerning their degree of gender inequality (low inequality: Germany, Austria, and Japan; relatively high inequality: Venezuela, India). According to Social Role Theory, sex differences should be more pronounced in countries with higher gender inequality, which are typically non-Western countries that have not been investigated in previous work.
Fourth, since our design includes ingroup cooperation and interactions with outgroups (i.e., cross-national interactions), we can also critically revisit another previously found sex difference in social dilemma cooperation (i.e., higher ingroup favouritism by men, referred to as the male-warrior hypothesis, Van Vugt, De Cremer, & Janssen, 2007) across a broader sample of participants. According to the male-warrior hypothesis, men are predicted to show higher ingroup favouritism than women. According to an evolutionary perspective, the experience of conflicts may have created selection pressures for psychological mechanisms in men to act more negatively (aggressively) towards other groups.
Method
Participants and design The overall data set (N = 2,429) consists of two separate data sets, each of which includes a test for six nations involving a 6 (sender nation) 9 7 (receiver nation) mixed design with receiver nation as a within-participants factor. The subsamples of both data sets were recruited via the professional online panel provider Toluna (https://de.toluna.com/), which offers services mainly for marketing research companies. Subsample 1 was collected in a study conducted in September 2015. This data set was merged with data from an earlier study from October 2013 originally conducted to investigate the effect of national stereotypes on cooperation (Dorrough & Gl€ ockner, 2016) . Since the existing Subsample 2 had a reasonable size (roughly 200 participants per country, total N = 1,227 participants), we decided, for pragmatic reasons, to collect a second data set with the same sample size without conducting a further a priori power analysis. A sensitivity analysis shows that with the overall sample including all 12 nations, even small effects of f = .06 could be detected with sufficient power of 1 -b = .95. With the available sample sizes per nation (N = 200-215), only medium-sized effects of f = .22 could be detected at conventional significance levels with power of 1 -b = .95. Hence, it cannot be expected that small effects, which seem to be reasonable for gender effects in this context, can be detected for all countries separately. For the sensitivity analysis, we assumed a two-sided test in a repeated measurement ANOVA as the closest pragmatic approximation for the cluster corrected regression analysis due to the fact that no convenient methods for power estimation of the latter analysis are yet available.
Subsample 1 Participants' payment ranged from two US Dollars (basic payment) to five US Dollars, depending on their decisions as well as those of their interaction partners.
As introduced above, our research was designed to involve participants from various nations that differ widely on the cultural dimensions suggested by Hofstede (Hofstede et al., 2010) . Furthermore, the included nations differ with regard to gender inequality (for the exact values for Hofstede and gender inequality, see Supporting Information, Table A1 ).
Materials and procedure
We assessed cooperation behaviour and expectations in a continuous one-shot twoperson prisoners' dilemma (Wahl & Nowak, 1999) with real monetary consequences. The game was computerized and run using an online survey platform (Unipark, www.unipark.de). The one-shot nature of the task excludes other effects that might be influenced by sex such as reputation concerns or risks of retaliation in repeated games (Andreoni & Miller, 1993) . For both subsamples, we used the same procedure for the relevant parts of the experiment (for additional details, see Supporting Information, A2). First, participants read the experimental instructions provided in their national language and answered four control questions. Participants who did not answer each of these control questions within three attempts were excluded from further participation to ensure sufficiently high data quality. These participants were not included in analyses, since they provided no additional data. 4 The experimental instructions informed participants they would interact with several other study participants. Participants were also told that they would receive additional information on each interaction partner prior to each interaction and that their interaction partners would also receive information about them. In addition, the instructions explained that, after completing the experiment, one of the decisions and a corresponding partner (e.g., the transfer towards a person from Mexico) would be selected at random and paid out according to the decisions made for that particular transfer. This procedure is a variant of the strategy method often used in social dilemma research (see Fischbacher, G€ achter, & Quercia, 2012 for the use of strategy methods in social dilemmas) and has the additional advantage that participation time is flexible so that different time zones were not a constraint.
For each interaction partner, participants received an endowment of 100 US cents. 5 From this endowment, they could transfer any amount in increments of 10 US cents to an interaction partner (i.e., continuous version of the prisoner's dilemma), who was asked to make the same decision without being aware of the interaction partner's choice. The amount transferred to the respective other person would be doubled by the experimenter and added to his or her account in case the respective decision was used as the basis for experimental payoff. Any amount not transferred remained in the personal account, resulting in the typical social dilemma structure. All participants first indicated their desired transfer amount for a random interaction partner from another country with no specific reference to national background (as a more general measure of cooperation behaviour) followed by one interaction partner each from their own nation and the five other nations included in the respective study. The interaction partner of unknown nationality was always presented first before the cross-national context was introduced. The other six interaction partners (including the interaction partner from the participant's own nation) were presented in random order. Participants were informed about the national background of their current interaction partner before making their transfer decision. To allow for flexible participation time and avoid any carry-over effects from one interaction to the next, participants were not informed of their interaction partners' transfers during the experiment. In addition to their transfer decisions, participants indicated their expectations regarding the respective interaction partner's transfer (again between 0 and 100 US cent). With the exception of information on nationality, interactions were fully anonymous. Hence, participants did not know whether their respective interaction partner was male or female. The studies involved additional measures (see also Dorrough & Gl€ ockner, 2016) that are not relevant to the analyses of sex differences in social dilemmas. Thus, these measures and the respective results are not reported here.
Results
Participants' general tendency to cooperate was measured by the amount of money (between 0 and 100 US cent) transferred to the interaction partner in the one-shot prisoner's dilemma. The results (Figure 1) show that in all nations except for Russia female participants tend to give descriptively less than their male counterparts, resulting in a considerable overall cooperation gap (Figure 1, last overall result) . Hence, in the general public sample, the behavioural results contradict the common stereotype of women being more cooperative than men. This result is confirmed by a t-test comparing average male and female transfers (one average transfer score was calculated per participant), showing that male participants on average transferred significantly more than female participants [transfer difference = 4.48, t(2,427) = 4.02, p < .001]. Furthermore, we ran an ordinary least-square (OLS) regression including sender and receiver nation dummies (Table 1, Model 1a) , which shows that, on average, men transferred 4.78 US cents more to their interaction partners than did women.
6 Tobit regressions lead to the same conclusion (Supporting Information, Table B1 ). This effect also holds with similar magnitude when excluding cross-national interactions by analysing behaviour towards persons from participants' own nation only (b = 4.12 US cents, p = .002). It is even more pronounced when analysing transfers towards a random interaction partner only (b = 6.89 US cents, p < .001). Furthermore, when controlling for additional factors, such as cultural similarity or spatial distance between nations that have been demonstrated to influence crossnational cooperation (Dorrough & Gl€ ockner, 2016) , the effect also remains stable (Supporting Information, B3). These results speak for the fact that the observed gender differences are not (only) a result of specific country combinations.
To investigate our second research question, we analysed participants' expectations concerning their interaction partner's behaviour as a potential mediator of these differences. In all countries except Germany, female participants tend to expect lower transfers than male participants (Figure 2) . Overall, there was a significant expectation gap of 5.14 US cents between the sexes (OLS regression see Table 1 , Model 2). [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com] 6 We controlled for dependencies in error terms resulting from the repeated measurement design by using regressions with cluster corrected standard errors at the individual level (Rogers, 1993) . To account for potential differences between subsamples, we also ran all five models reported in Table 1 including a sample dummy (i.e., subsample 1 vs. subsample 2) and it's interaction with participant sex (male = 1; female = 0). Conclusions regarding sex differences remain unchanged. Furthermore, we did not observe main effects of subsample on transfer, expectation, or net-transfer. .038
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Effect-coded sender (all models) and receiver (all models but 1c due to multicollinearity) nation dummies are omitted. The constant represents the grand mean. All variables are centred. Coefficients indicate deviations from the grand mean. t statistics are in parentheses. **p < .01, ***p < .001.
To investigate whether the gap in transfers can be explained by sex differences in expectations, we also ran the regression predicting transfers while additionally controlling for participants' expectations. The respective transfer effect disappears in this analysis (Table 1 , Model 1b), indicating that the reduced cooperativeness of female participants might be driven by lower expectations. A Sobel-Goodman mediation analysis with transfer as the dependent variable, participant sex as the independent variable, and expectation as the mediator variable as well as age and sender and receiver nation dummies as control variables revealed that 82% of the direct effect of sex on cooperation was mediated by expectations (total indirect effect: b = 3.92, p < .001; mediation analysis using bootstrapping with 5,000 replications to estimate standard errors with clustering at the participant level).
To analyse the difference between behaviour in mere prosocial and altruistic situations in which differences between men and women are typically found (see introduction of this article), we generated a proxy for prosociality by relying on a particular design property of our studies. Specifically, in a two-person continuous prisoner's dilemma game with one-time interactions, reciprocating as much as or even more than one expects to receive can be understood as a friendly act that results from a concern for the outcome of the other person. Giving less than one expects to receive, in contrast, can be considered a selfish and less friendly act. Hence, the difference between a person's own transfer and his or her expectation concerning the other person's transfer, which we refer to as nettransfer, is a proxy for altruism and concern for the welfare of others. Using net-transfer as the dependent measure, the gap between the sexes descriptively reverses for seven of the 12 nations in that female participants behave more prosocially than male participants (Figure 3) . Although the overall effect is not significant (Table 1 considering differences between situations of mere prosocial behaviour and strategic interactions in social dilemmas. To investigate our third research question, we analysed the degree of universality (vs. variation) of sex differences in cooperation across countries. As can be seen from Figure 1 , the direction of the gap in transfers is relatively consistent over nations, and the overall sex difference in transfer holds when controlling for sender and receiver nation dummies, which speaks for at least some universality of the observed sex differences. However, the magnitude of the transfer effect also shows some variability supported by a significant between-nation heterogeneity (v 2 = 62.03, df = 11, p < .001). 7 In individual country analyses, the difference between male and female transfers was significant at conventional levels for Japan only 8 (see also Figure 1 ) and ranged from a transfer difference of 11.28 Cents for Japan to a non-significant reversal of 1.25 Cents for Russia. As explained above, according to Social Role Theory (Eagly & Wood, 1999) , sex differences should be more pronounced in societies with diverging social roles and thus a high inequality between men and women. As an indicator for gender (in-)equality, we used the Gender Inequality Index (http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/gender-inequality-index-gii). This index is the successor of the Gender Development Index and the Gender Empowerment Measure, which have been used in previous research and measure gender inequalities based on country in terms of important aspects of human development. Results show that, in our data, gender inequality could not explain the variation in the magnitude of sex differences (Cohen's d) in transfers (r spearman = 0.15; p = .65) or expectations (r spearman = À0.25, p = .42) between countries (for a graphical illustration, see Supporting Information, Figure B3) . 9 Finally, we tested our last research question concerning the male-warrior hypothesis, according to which men show higher ingroup favouritism than women. When predicting transfer by interacting with persons from one's own country (ingroup) versus other countries, as well as the interaction between participant sex and the ingroup, we do not find support for this hypothesis (Table 1, Model 1c) . Specifically, there is no significant interaction effect of participant sex and an ingroup indicator on the dependent variable transfer; the non-significant difference is even in the opposite direction, since a positive coefficient (i.e., increased ingroup favouritism for males) was predicted. Hence, our data provide no support for the male-warrior hypothesis (Van Vugt et al., 2007) . Given the high power of the analyses and the broad sample of participants, the findings clearly strengthen the null hypothesis at least for the specific paradigm used.
Discussion
In two comprehensive studies including samples from 12 nations, we investigated the validity of the common stereotype that women behave more cooperatively, and thus more prosocially, than men. In contrast to this stereotype, we found a significant and consistent effect in the opposite direction: men behave more cooperatively than women in one-shot prisoner's dilemma games. This result is -at least at first sight -not in line with predictions of evolutionary approaches, the social constructionist perspective, and the biosocial Social Role Theory, which -each for different reasons -predict women to be more communal and cooperative than men (for an overview, see Wood & Eagly, 2002) . Our finding also somewhat contradicts the overall null effect of sex on cooperation in social dilemmas reported in the most comprehensive meta-analysis conducted to date (Balliet et al., 2011) . Balliet and colleagues concluded that sex differences are highly context dependent. According to our data, men are more cooperative than women when using one-shot interactions in prisoner's dilemmas and including a more diverse set of countries and participants. However, further studies are needed to investigate sex differences in other contexts.
With respect to our second research question, we found that this lower degree of cooperation in women appears to be driven by sex differences in terms of expectations. Female participants were more sceptical concerning the cooperation of their interaction partners in that they had lower expectations concerning how much money they might receive. These lower expectations mediate the observed sex differences. This result is in line with recent findings from a methodologically similar investigation of the trust game (Romano et al., 2017) , in which women also transferred less in the role of trustor and had lower expectations than men. Overall, our findings indicate that -in contrast to the common stereotype -women are not without exception more prosocial than men. In situations involving the risk of being exploited such as the prisoner's dilemma, the gap between the sexes even reverses.
Although the above mentioned theories generally predict increased prosocial and cooperative behaviour by women, the consideration of an additional aspect may provide at least a post-hoc explanation for our findings. Specifically, the theories suggest not only that women behave in a more communally oriented manner but also that men are more tolerant towards risks due to primeval selection pressures (e.g., Buss & Kenrick, 1998) or the adaptation to specific social roles (Eagly & Wood, 1999) . In line with these arguments, and related to previous results in other economic games (e.g., Buchan et al., 2008; Romano et al., 2017) , we find that the effect of sex on transfer behaviour in one-shot prisoner's dilemmas is mediated by women's lower expectations (which represents a cognitive aspect of the fear of being exploited) regarding their interaction partner's cooperation. Overall, when using a proxy for pure prosociality (net-transfer) as the dependent variable, the observed sex difference in transfer disappears and, in individual analyses, the gap even tends to reverse for some nations (e.g., England and Australia), although not significantly so. A closer look at the distribution of amounts transferred and expected reveals that men and women differ with regard to their propensity to send the maximum amount of 100 US cent, in particular. Specifically, the maximum amount is expected and transferred much more often by male than female participants (Supporting Information, Figure B1 and B2) -a result that corresponds to previous findings in trust games (Buchan et al., 2008) .
Although we observe significant overall sex differences in social dilemma transfers and expectations, it should be noted that the effect sizes for these sex differences are small and, in individual analyses, significant only for Japan. Overall, women transfer only approximately four out of 100 cents less than men (d = À0.13, 95% CI [À0.16, À0.10]). The effect sizes are even substantially smaller for some of the individual nations (see Supporting Information, Table C1 for all effect sizes). Still, a sex difference of four cents means that men cooperate approximately 10% more than women in relative terms, which can arguably be considered substantial. Furthermore, the overall effect size is similar in magnitude to other effect sizes for sex differences in social dilemmas (e.g., Balliet et al., 2011;  for the difference between male-male and female-female interactions, d = 0.16, or the difference between men and women in mixed-sex interactions, d = À0.22) and sex differences in other domains (Hyde, 2005) . As noted earlier, with the available sample sizes per nation (200-215), only medium-sized effects of f = .22 could have been detected at conventional significance levels with power of 1 -b = .95 for these country level analyses.
In sum, results concerning our first and second research question highlight the importance of taking into account situational characteristics. In addition to prosociality, altruism and a concern for others' outcomes -all attributes typically associated with the female sex -risk attitudes and trust also play a role in social dilemmas. Women tend to be less trusting and more risk averse than men and, at the same time, have an increased tendency to be prosocial. These factors potentially overlay each other and must be taken into account when measuring sex differences in cooperation. To learn more about these underlying mechanisms, future studies should include a priori measures of social preferences, risk aversion, and interpersonal trust. This would also allow researchers to more critically test whether women's lower levels of cooperativeness in social dilemmas are, indeed, driven by their fears regarding their interaction partner's cooperation.
Our third research question concerned whether potential sex differences are universal in direction and magnitude across countries, as suggested by an evolutionary approach, or vary between countries as predicted from a social constructivist perspective. Our findings generally support an in-between position taking into account both inherent factors and social influences as suggested by Social Role Theory. On the one hand, we observed a gap in transfers and expectations that remains stable when controlling for sender and receiver nations and additional factors that have been demonstrated to influence cross-national cooperation (Dorrough & Gl€ ockner, 2016; see Supporting Information, B3; Table B2 ) and that can also be observed for cooperation with a random interaction partner and the ingroup only. These results indicate some degree of universality in sex differences and, therefore, provide partial support for an evolutionary perspective assuming that those differences are a result of innate temperamental differences between men and women that evolved by natural selection (e.g., Buss & Kenrick, 1998) . On the other hand, we observed considerable variations in magnitude. Differences between men and women in our studies appear particularly pronounced for some nations as compared to others. This might result from diverse structural conditions in the participating nations in line with a social constructionist approach (e.g., Mead, 1935) . Hence, findings are most in line with a mixed influence model such as Social Role Theory (Eagly & Wood, 1999) . As introduced above, according to the Social Role Theory, sex differences originate in innate differences that are accentuated by social structures, in that men and women occupy different roles, increasingly adjust their behaviour to those roles over time, and consequentially become psychologically different (Eagly & Wood, 1999) . Following this rationale, Social Role Theory predicts that, in societies with higher gender inequality, men and women tend to more strongly occupy different roles, which subsequently results in more pronounced sex differences. Such a relationship was, for example, supported by the finding that the difference between males' and females' mate preferences decreases with a society's gender equality (Eagly & Wood, 1999) . In our data, however, we do not find a correlation between a nation's gender inequality and the observed degree of sex difference in cooperation (and expectations). Still, considering the fact that, in addition to a newly conducted study, our research was based on a re-analysis of one data set that was not designed to include countries that differ in terms of gender inequality, and the relationships predicted by Social Role Theory should be revisited in future research. This work should include additional nations that more strongly differ with regard to gender inequality before rejecting the hypothesis. Furthermore, future research should also consider additional indices of societal structure such as the rule of law as a basis for gender equality. Of course, this would require that countries are selected that also differ sufficiently with regard to the additional factors of interest. It is also important to note that, in our study, rule of law (and likely also other reasonable between-country factors) could not be investigated due to low variance in these factors (e.g., all countries included in our studies had comparably high rule of law scores).
Finally, studies could systematically investigate sex differences in repeated interactions, since it is likely that sex differences might increase over the course of time (Balliet et al., 2011; Rapoport & Chammah, 1965) , which might arguably be related to differences in risk preferences, as well.
Concerning our last research question, we found no increased ingroup favouritism for male as compared to female participants. Hence, in our study there is no support for the male-warrior hypothesis, which is also derived from an evolutionary approach (Van Vugt et al., 2007) .
Conclusion
Our data provide evidence that men cooperate more than women in one-shot prisoner's dilemmas when examining non-WEIRD participants and multiple countries. Although established theories such as Social Role Theory, social constructivist approaches, and evolutionary approaches potentially provide post-hoc explanations for these results, hypotheses derived a priori predict the exact opposite. Thus, our findings indicate that these theories require additional specification in order to increase their empirical content (Gl€ ockner & Betsch, 2011; Popper, 1934) and thus enable distinct a priori predictions. Based on our findings, it appears reasonable to consider more complex mechanisms for decision-making that are based on differential beliefs and expectations. Our finding indicating a certain degree of universality regarding the gender difference between countries as well as the above-random differences in the effect magnitudes can best be explained by Social Role Theory, which assumes innate factors that are accentuated by social influences.
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